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Two modes of sensorimotor integration in
intention-based and stimulus-based actions
Arvid Herwig and Wolfgang Prinz
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
Florian Waszak
Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS & Universite´ Rene´ Descartes, Paris, France
Human actions may be driven endogenously (to produce desired environmental effects) or exogenously
(to accommodate to environmental demands). There is a large body of evidence indicating that these two
kinds of action are controlled by different neural substrates. However, only little is known about what
happens—in functional terms—on these different “routes to action”. Ideomotor approaches claim that
actions are selected with respect to their perceptual consequences. We report experiments that support
the validity of the ideomotor principle and that, at the same time, show that it is subject to a far-reaching
constraint: It holds for endogenously driven actions only! Our results suggest that the activity of the
two “routes to action” is based on different types of learning: The activity of the system guiding
stimulus-based actions is accompanied by stimulus–response (sensorimotor) learning, whereas the
activity of the system controlling intention-based actions results in action–effect (ideomotor) learning.
There are two principal ways in which humans can
interact with their environment. They may either
carry out movements to manipulate the environ-
ment in order to produce desired environmental
effects, or carry out movements to accommodate
environmental demands. The first kind of move-
ment may be referred to as voluntary, operant, or
intentional. This kind of motor act is selected on
the basis of the agent’s intentions. The second
kind is performed on the basis of prior stimulus
events and may be called reaction.
Neuroanatomical routes to action
The question as to how humans’ interactions with
the environment are controlled is a key question in
neuroscience. The past decades witnessed a great
deal of research trying to understand the neural
mechanisms underlying reactive and intentional
actions. It has been shown that the two kinds of
action are controlled by different neural substrates,
even if the way intention-based and stimulus-
based actions are manifested by the body are
the same in terms of muscle activity, observed
kinematics, and dynamics. Recent neuroscientific
studies suggest that intention-based actions are
mediated by fronto-striatal circuits, including
the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingu-
late, and SMA (medial premotor cortex). By
contrast, stimulus-based actions are supposed to be
controlled by different, task-dependent pathways
(Passingham, Toni, & Rushworth, 2000; Toni,
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Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001): one stream for
movements directed to the location of a stimulus
(including portions of the parietal cortex and of
the ventral premotor cortex) and another stream
(involving the ventral stream extending into the
ventral prefrontal cortex) that is supposed to take
effect whenever visual stimuli determine which
among different possible actions is appropriate to
perform (arbitrary mappings).
Sensorimotor versus ideomotor learning
Despite the steadily growing body of knowledge
about the neuroanatomical substrate guiding the
various kinds of action, only little is known
about what happens—in functional terms—on
these different “routes to action”. With regard to
stimulus-based actions, there are several general
accounts. Most early and some modern accounts
of reactive movements refer to some higher
entity that intercedes between stimulus and
response—the will (e.g., Donders, 1868/1969);
“supervisory attentional system” (e.g., Norman &
Shallice, 1986). However, following Exner
(1879), Hommel (2000) suggested recently that
the cognitive system is prepared ahead of the
stimulus to act upon presentation of a particular
stimulus in a specified way. In this sense, reactions
are like “prepared reflexes”, which include a
representation of the action to be performed and
also a specification of the condition(s) under
which the action should be carried out. It is
assumed that a simple association process mediates
the application/build-up of these stimulus–
response rules: Selecting (and executing) an action
in response to a given stimulus creates a
representation that “binds” the codes of the action-
relevant stimulus attributes and the corresponding
action codes (stimulus–response bindings). These
rules may be stored in memory, such that they may
serve to trigger actions on subsequent occasions
(see Allport, 1987; Logan, 1988; and also
Hommel, Po¨sse, & Waszak, 2000). A prominent
example of the activity of these stimulus–response
rules is “utilization behaviour” (Lhermitte, 1983;
Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989), a patho-
logical failure of executive control that is
characterized by inability to inhibit actions from
being triggered by the mere sight of an object with
which the action is habitually associated.
Evidently, exogenously driven actions exist on a
continuum with regard to their “reflex-likeness”.
For real reflexes stimulus information is both a
necessary and a sufficient condition, so that the
execution of the action follows the presentation
of the stimulus instantaneously, reflex-like. For
other stimulus-based actions the stimulus may
only be one source of information. The other is
an intentional set to respond to that information
in a particular way (which, in experimental set-
tings, is usually specified through instructions).
We assume that the more complex or time con-
suming these additional processing steps specified
in the intentional set are, the less reflex-like the
action. One possibility to decrease the reflex-
likeness of exogenously driven actions is to decou-
ple response selection and response execution by
delaying the latter. For reasons outlined below,
Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b do not only investigate
reflex-like, immediate stimulus-based actions but
also delayed stimulus-based actions.
As for intention-based actions, most scientific
definitions consider an action to be voluntary if it
aims at producing some internally prespecified
effect. More importantly, action effects are also
believed to play a core role in the control of inten-
tional actions (see, Hommel, 2000; Prinz, 1997).
The ideomotor theory of action control that can
be traced back to the middle of the 19th century
(Harless, 1861; Lotze, 1852) suggests a model
of how humans, given a particular goal, select a
suitable action. Ideomotor approaches claim that
performing an action leaves behind an association
between the action’s motor code and the sensory
effects the action produces (“action–effect bind-
ings”). These associations are bidirectional
and, thus, can be used to retrieve an action by
“anticipating” its effects. In other words, inten-
tion-based actions are selected with respect to
their perceptual consequences (Prinz, 1997).
One of the key findings supporting the ideomo-
tor principle comes from Elsner and Hommel
(2001). They made subjects first work through
an acquisition phase, in which a self-selected
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keypress was always followed by a certain tone
(e.g., left keypress ! high-pitch tone; right key-
press ! low-pitch tone). In a subsequent test
phase, the same tones were presented as target
stimuli in response to which subjects had to
perform a speeded-choice response. In this test
phase, an action was performed faster in response
to the tone that the action had previously produced
(in the example, low-pitch tone! right keypress)
than to a tone that had been produced by the
alternative action (in the example, high-pitch
tone ! right keypress). In accordance with the
ideomotor principle, this result suggests that the
perception of a learned sensory effect activates
“backwardly” the action it is associated with: In
the acquisition phase, subjects had acquired associ-
ations between the keypresses and the subsequent
tones, which, in the test phase, influence the acti-
vation of the choice responses. Moreover, Elsner
et al. (2002) showed that the mere perception of
learned action effects result in activation of the
rostral SMA proper, which is straightforward
evidence that the SMA—which takes part in the
“voluntary route to action”—is engaged in the
cortical representation of the learned association
between actions and effects.
In short, there is evidence that intention-based
actions, on the one hand, and stimulus-based
actions, on the other hand, are controlled by differ-
ent neural pathways and that the activity of these
pathways relies on different kinds of memory
traces. The activity of the reaction system is
based on the compilation of stimulus–response
rules specifying which motor routines action-
relevant objects habitually require (sensorimotor
learning). By contrast, the activity of the volitional
system should be based on the compilation of
action–effect rules specifying which action pro-
duces which effect (ideomotor learning). If this
framework concerning the difference in percep-
tuomotor integration (stimulus–response vs.
action–effect) between the two kinds of action
holds true, action–effect integration as demon-
strated by Elsner and Hommel (2001) should
occur only if the subjects operate in the voluntary
“mode” of movement—that is, if the actions are
controlled by the voluntary action system.
Four experiments were conducted to test this
prediction by replicating the experiments by
Elsner and Hommel (2001) with different types
of acquisition phase (manipulated between sub-
jects). These experiments compared an intention-
based acquisition phase (corresponding to the
one used by Elsner & Hommel) with different
types of stimulus-based acquisition phase.
Subjects of the intention-based groups were
required to freely select between two possible
actions. In the stimulus-based groups, by contrast,
the participants’ actions were triggered by external
stimulus events.
However, in all groups the actions were contin-
gently followed by certain effect tones. That is,
participants performed in all groups certain
actions (keypresses with the index finger of the
left or the right hand), and in all groups the
actions were immediately followed by effect
tones (e.g., left keypress ! high-pitch tone;
right keypress ! low-pitch tone). The only
difference between the groups was whether the
actions were selected in an intention- or in a
stimulus-based mode of movement. If ideomotor
learning takes place only if the participants
operate in the intention-based mode, then transfer
effects as demonstrated by Elsner and Hommel
(2001) should be observed only with intention-
based acquisition, but not with stimulus-based
acquisition.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 replicated the experiment by Elsner
and Hommel (2001) with two different types of
acquisition phase. The first type—the intention-
based acquisition—corresponds to the one used
by Elsner and Hommel. In this group, participants
were instructed to produce one of two keypresses
depending on their own choice. In contrast, the
second type of acquisition—the stimulus-based
acquisition—was composed of stimulus-based
actions—that is, the actions that participants per-
formed were triggered by external stimulus events.
We explored two types of stimulus-based actions
(cf. Passingham, Toni, & Rushworth, 2000;
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Toni, Rushworth, & Passingham, 2001): actions
with arbitrary and actions with spatially compati-
ble stimulus–response mappings.
Material and methods
Participants
A total of 78 participants (ages 20–30 years) naı¨ve
to the purpose of the experiment participated in
the study. The participants were randomly
assigned to three groups of 26 participants each.
For the first group of participants, the acquisition
phase was intention based (INT). In the other two
groups, the acquisition phase was stimulus based
(spatial, stim-SPA and arbitrary, stim-ARB, see
below). The data of 4 participants were lost due
to technical failure.
Stimuli and apparatus
The display and timing were controlled by an
IBM-compatible computer, interfaced to a 17-
inch EIZO FLEXSCAN 9080i-M monitor. The
visual stimuli were displayed on a black back-
ground. A small white cross (þ) presented in the
centre of the screen served as fixation point. In
the INT group, a white asterisk was presented
about 0.88 below the fixation point to signal the
participant to choose an action. In the stim-SPA
group, a small square was presented about 0.88
below and about 0.88 to the left or to the right
of the fixation point to indicate the response. In
the stim-ARB group, the response was indicated
by a small green or red square presented about
0.88 below the fixation point. The viewing dis-
tance was about 70 cm. The asterisk and the
squares subtended a visual angle of 0.38 in width
and 0.38 in height. The participants performed
the (stimulus-based and intention-based) actions
with their left and right index fingers. Auditory
stimuli were MIDI tones (instrument Marimba)
of 400 Hz (low pitch) or 800 Hz (high pitch), pre-
sented simultaneously through the left and right
speaker of a headphone. Both tones were 200 ms
in duration.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of a single session of
about 30 min and was divided into an acquisition
phase and a test phase.
Acquisition phase, intention-based (INT group). On
appearance of the asterisk, participants had to press
one of the two response keys. The participants
were instructed to choose the keypress at random
“as if they tossed a coin before each trial”. They
were not told to respond as fast as possible.
Acquisition phase, stimulus-based (stim-SPA and
stim-ARB group). In the stimulus-based conditions
the participants were required to press the key that
corresponded to the target stimulus. In the stim-
SPA group, the actions were triggered by stimuli
spatially compatible to the required responses (left
square ! left response, right square ! right
response); in the stim-ARB group, they were trig-
gered by arbitrary stimuli (green square!left
response; red square ! right response; counterba-
lanced across subjects). Participants were instructed
to respond as fast as possible. Responses were given
on a keyboard with two response keys separated by a
horizontal distance of 13.5 mm.
In all three groups, each keypress (left/right)
triggered a particular effect tone (high/low). The
tone was presented immediately after the keypress
(stimulus onset asynchrony ¼ 0 ms). The action–
effect mapping was balanced across subjects.
Incorrect keypresses, response omissions, and
anticipations were recorded and fed back to the
participants by a visual warning message. After
the response and the effect tone, the display went
blank for 1,000 ms (except for the fixation
point). After that, the procedure was repeated for
the next trial. Participants worked through 20
practice trials and 260 acquisition trials (i.e., two
action–effect pairs with 130 repetitions each).
Test phase. The test phase was the same for all
three groups of participants. After completing
the acquisition trials, participants were instructed
for the test phase. In each test trial, one of the
two effect tones was presented as a target stimulus
in response to which participants were required to
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respond as fast as possible according to a fixed
stimulus–response mapping.
For each of the three acquisition groups, there
were two subgroups of participants: In the acqui-
sition-compatible subgroup, the participants had
to respond with the key that preceded the tone
in the acquisition phase. For instance, participants
who had experienced the action–effect mapping
“left key ! low tone/right key ! high tone”
were now required to respond to the low tone
with the left index finger and to the high tone
with the right index finger. In the acquisition-
incompatible groups, the participants were to
respond with the key that preceded the other
tone in the acquisition phase. For instance, partici-
pants who had experienced the action–effect
mapping “left key ! low tone/right key ! high
tone” were now required to respond to the
low tone with the right index finger and to the
high tone with the left index finger.
Each test trial started after an intertrial interval
(ITI) of 1,000 ms. After the ITI the low or high
tone was presented for 200 ms. The next ITI
started immediately after the participants’ reac-
tion. Incorrect keypresses, response omissions,
and anticipations were treated as in the acquisition
phase. Participants worked through 10 practice
trials and 200 valid test trials (two effect-response
mappings with 100 repetitions each).
Results
The significance criterion was set to p, .05 for all
analyses (one-tailed for t tests of predicted effects).
Acquisition phase
We did not analyse RTs in the intention-based
group, since the reactions in this group were not
speeded. Suffice it to say that participants executed
freely selected actions about 220 ms after the onset
of the asterisk.
For the stimulus-based groups, only correct
responses were analysed (stim-SPA: 99.1%; stim-
ARB: 96.7%). Individual median reaction times
(RTs) were calculated. Not surprisingly, spatially
compatible reactions (stim-SPA overall: 273 ms)
were faster than arbitrary reactions (stim-ARB
overall: 387 ms). Importantly, within the two
stimulus-based groups (i.e., between the acqui-
sition-compatible vs. acquisition-incompatible sub-
groups), RTs in the acquisition phase were not
different.
Test phase
Only correct responses were analysed (stim-SPA:
96.2%; stim-ARB: 97.5%; INT: 94.9%). Table 1
shows median RTs and percentages of error as a
function of acquisition group (INT vs. stim-SPA
vs. stim-ARB) and compatibility (acquisition-com-
patible vs. acquisition-incompatible). The error
pattern did not counteract the RT pattern; thus, a
speed–accuracy trade-off can be excluded. The
rightmost column of Table 1 shows the compatibility
effect for the three acquisition groups: mean
RT(incompatible)–mean RT(compatible). In the
intention-based acquisition group (INT), mean
RTs of participants responding with the “compati-
ble” actions (i.e., the actions that preceded the
target tones in the acquisition phase) were signifi-
cantly shorter than mean RTs of participants
responding with the “incompatible” actions (i.e.,
the actions that preceded the “other” tone in the
acquisition phase). This result is a replication of the
finding of Elsner and Hommel (e.g., 2001) described
above. More importantly, in both stimulus-based
acquisition groups (stim-SPA and stim-ARB), the
pattern of result was reversed. The pattern of
Table 1. Reaction times and percentages of error in the test phase of
Experiment 1, as a function of learning group and compatibility,
and compatibility effect for reaction times
Acquisition Compatibility RT PE CE
INT compatible 288 (10) 5.3 36
incompatible 324 (15) 4.3
Stim-ARB compatible 322 (11) 2.3 231
incompatible 291 (9) 2.3
Stim-SPA compatible 308 (16) 4.8 230
incompatible 278 (10) 2.5
Note: RT: reaction times (in ms; SE in parentheses). PE: per-
centages of error (in %). CE: compatibility effect (incompa-
tible–compatible). INT: intention based. Stim: stimulus
based. SPA: spatial. ARB: arbitrary.
p , .05.
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results is confirmed by an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with two between-subjects factors: 3
(acquisition group)  2 (compatibility group). The
only significant effect was the interaction, F(2, 68)
¼ 5.145, p, .01, demonstrating that effect of com-
patibility differs between the acquisition groups.
Separate t tests revealed the compatibility effect to
be significant (or almost significant) in all three
acquisition groups: group INT, t(24) ¼ 2.06,
p ,.05; group stim-SPA, t(22) ¼ 1.59, p ¼ .06;
group stim-ARB, t(22) ¼ 2.11, p, .05.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 strongly support the
hypothesis that action–effect learning depends
on the mode of movement. Action–effect learning
as demonstrated by Elsner and Hommel (2001)
was found only for the intention-based acquisition
group (INT). In this group an action was indeed
faster if triggered by a tone that had previously
been produced by the action (compatible con-
dition) than if triggered by a tone that had been
produced by the alternative action (incompatible
condition).
In contrast to the intention-based acquisition
group (INT), participants of both stimulus-based
acquisition groups (stim-SPA and stim-ARB)
were faster when they had to respond with the
incompatible action than when they had to
respond with the compatible action. The fact
that the compatibility effect is negative could be
explained by assuming that, in the course of each
stimulus–response (S–R) event, an event file
(Hommel, 1998) is compiled that does not only
link action-relevant stimulus features with the cor-
responding action codes (e.g., Logan & Etherton,
1994; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003, 2005a),
but that also includes the information that other
stimuli presented during or directly after the
stimulus–response event do not take part in the
S–R episode. These other stimulus events may
be labelled with tags similar to the “to-be-
ignored” tags (Neill, 1997; Neill & Valdes, 1992)
proposed to explain negative priming (for a
review see, Fox, 1995). These tags may establish
a kind of negative association between the code
of the stimulus (action effect) and the code of
the action so that presenting the action effects as
targets interferes with the execution of an
acquisition-compatible action. However, in all fol-
lowing experiments, we found a null effect with
stimulus-based acquisition, as originally assumed.
Therefore, we will not come back to this issue.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 explored which of two factors
boosts/hampers ideomotor learning. To do so,
Experiment 2 contrasted stimulus-based arbitrary
mappings that were executed either immediately
after stimulus onset (immediate) or withheld
until the presentation of a go signal (delayed).
We suppose that delayed actions take an inter-
mediate position between intention-based and
immediate stimulus-based actions. On the one
hand, the actions are selected with respect to
some external information and, therefore, can be
called stimulus based. On the other hand, the
execution of the motor programme resembles
intention-based actions in that the action is not
carried out in a reflex-like fashion. Let us assume
that ideomotor learning occurs only if the locus
of response selection is internal (i.e., if the decision
which action to perform is determined voluntarily)
but that it breaks down whenever the locus of
response selection is external (i.e., whenever the
decision which action to perform is subject to an
external constraint). If so, transfer effects as
shown by Elsner and Hommel (2001) should be
observed with intention-based acquisition only,
but not with stimulus-based acquisition, whether
delayed or immediate. If, by contrast, it is the
“reflex-likeness” of response execution that
matters (i.e., if ideomotor learning does not take
place if actions are carried out in a speeded
reflex-like manner), then one would expect to
find transfer effects with intention-based as well
as with delayed stimulus-based acquisition.
To replicate the effect of the intention-based
acquisition group found in Experiment 1,
Experiment 2 also included an intention-based
acquisition group.
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Method
Participants
A sample of 83 participants (ages 21–37 years)
participated in Experiment 2. The participants
were randomly assigned to three groups with 24
participants each. For the first group of partici-
pants, the acquisition phase was intention based
(INT). In the other two groups, the acquisition
phase was stimulus based: stim-IMM (immedi-
ately) and stim-DEL (delayed), see below. In
order to increase the statistical power for the con-
trast within the stim-IMM group we increased the
number of participants of this group by 8. The data
of 3 participants were lost due to technical failure
(2 stim-DEL; 1 stim-IMM).
Material, methods, stimuli, and apparatus
The methods of Experiment 2 were the same as
those in Experiment 1, with some minor excep-
tions described in the following. (Most changes
were done to make the experiment more similar
to the original study of Elsner & Hommel,
2001.) In the two stimulus-based groups (stim-
IMM and stim-DEL) either a green or a red
asterisk (0.38 in width and 0.38 in height) was
used to indicate to the participant which action
to perform (instead of a square as in Experiment
1). In the stim-DEL group, a second white aster-
isk presented at the same position as the first
coloured asterisk served as a go signal for the
execution of the precued response.
Procedure
Acquisition phase. The acquisition phase of the
INT and stim-IMM group was the same as that
in Experiment 1. Participants in the new stim-
DEL group were required to withhold their
response until presentation of the go signal,
which appeared 800 ms after the onset of the
coloured cue. Once again, in all groups, the
participants’ keypress (left/right) triggered a par-
ticular effect tone (high/low). However, just as
in the original study of Elsner and Hommel
(2001) the tone was now presented 50 ms after
the keypress. As in the study from Elsner and
Hommel (2001), erroneous trials were repeated
at the end of the block, and participants worked
now through 8 practice trials and 200 valid acqui-
sition trials (Experiment 1: 260 trials) with an ITI
of 1,500 ms (Experiment 1: 1,000 ms).
Test phase. The test phase was the same for all
three groups of participants. The only changes to
Experiment 1 concerned the ITI (now 1,500 ms
instead of 1,000 ms).
Results
Acquisition phase
Participants of the intention-based group executed
freely selected actions about 274 ms after the onset
of the asterisk.
For the stimulus-based groups, only correct
responses without omissions or anticipations
were analysed (stim-IMM: 97.1%; stim-DEL:
96.3%). Since, in contrast to Experiment 1, trials
with latencies exceeding 1,000 ms were excluded,
individual mean RTs instead of median RTs
were calculated. Precued reactions (stim-DEL
overall: 280 ms) were faster than uncued reactions
(stim-IMM overall: 383 ms). RTs did not differ
between the acquisition-compatible versus acqui-
sition-incompatible subgroups.
Test phase
Trials with response omissions (0.35 %) and
anticipations (0.03 %) were excluded from the
analysis. Furthermore, only RTs from correct
responses were analysed (INT: 98.2%; stim-
IMM: 97.9%; stim-DEL: 98.0%). Table 2 shows
mean RTs and percentages of error (PE) as a func-
tion of acquisition group (INT vs. stim-IMM vs.
stim-DEL) and compatibility (acquisition-
compatible vs. acquisition-incompatible). An
effect of compatibility was observed in the inten-
tion-based group only (INT ¼ 71 ms). In both
stimulus-based acquisition groups there was no
compatibility effect whatsoever (stim-IMM ¼
10 ms; stim-DEL ¼ –8 ms). An ANOVA was
run including the two between-subjects factors
acquisition group (INT vs. stim-IMM vs. stim-
DEL) and compatibility group (acquisition-
compatible vs. acquisition-incompatible). The
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almost significant main effects of acquisition
group, F(2, 74) ¼ 3.024, p ¼ .06, and compatibil-
ity group, F(1, 74)¼ 3.517, p¼ .07, were qualified
by a significant interaction, F(2, 74) ¼ 3.119, p ,
.05, demonstrating that effect of compatibility
differs between the acquisition groups. Separate t
tests revealed the compatibility effect to be signifi-
cant in the intention-based acquisition group:
group INT, t(22) ¼ 3.45, p , .01, but not in the
two stimulus-based acquisition groups: group
stim-IMM, t(30) ¼ 0.50, p ¼ .31; group stim-
DEL, t(22) ¼ –0.33, p ¼ .37.
Although incorrect keypresses were rare
(between 1.1 and 2.9 %), an ANOVA of error
rates revealed a significant main effect of compat-
ibility group, F(1, 74) ¼ 6.684, p , .05, which
indicated fewer response errors of participants
responding with the “compatible” actions than of
participants responding with the “incompatible”
actions. In view of the PE values reported in
Table 2 this compatibility effect seems to be
based primarily on the two stimulus-based acqui-
sition groups. In other words, it looks as if there
was some kind of speed–accuracy trade-off in
the stimulus-based groups. Evidently this would
undermine our line of argument (viz., that there
was no compatibility effect in the stimulus-based
acquisition groups). However, first of all, notice
that neither the main effect of acquisition group
nor the interaction was significant (all Fs , 1)
for PEs. Second, neither the original study by
Elsner and Hommel (2001) nor the other exper-
iments of the present study (Experiments 1, 3a,
and 3b) revealed a compatibility effect in the
error rates, whatsoever. Hence, although the
error data of Experiment 2 yielded a compatibility
effect for all acquisition groups, in view of the
whole data pattern of the present study, this
result should not be overrated.
Discussion
The results of the RT analysis once again con-
firmed that action–effect learning depends on
the mode of movement. In accordance with
Experiment 1, a positive compatibility effect was
found only for the INT group. By contrast, in
the stimulus-based groups, no compatibility
effect was observed at all. A more detailed discus-
sion of the results is delayed until the General
Discussion.
EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B
Evidently, it is possible that the stimulus-based
acquisition groups fail to show compatibility
effects due to lack of statistical power. To
overcome this problem, we ran two additional
experiments with larger sample sizes, which
focused on the stimulus-based acquisition. In
Experiments 3a and 3b we systematically crossed
the two factors investigated in the first two exper-
iments: We explored stimulus-based actions that
had either arbitrary or spatial mappings and that
were executed either immediately or delayed.
Method
Participants
A sample of 160 participants (ages 19–37 years) par-
ticipated in Experiment 3a (100 participants) and in
Experiment 3b (60 participants). There were two
stimulus-based acquisition groups in both exper-
iments. Whereas in Experiment 3a participants per-
formed either delayed (stim-DEL-ARB) or
immediate (stim-IMM-ARB) actions in response
Table 2. Reaction times and percentages of error in the test phase of
Experiment 2, as a function of learning group and compatibility,
and compatibility effect for reaction times
Acquisition Compatibility RT PE CE
INT compatible 318 (14) 1.7 (0.4) 71
incompatible 389 (15) 2.0 (0.7)
Stim-IMM compatible 312 (15) 1.5 (0.3) 10
incompatible 322 (14) 2.6 (0.4)
Stim-DEL compatible 347 (18) 1.1 (0.4) 28
incompatible 339 (18) 2.9 (0.8)
Note: RT: reaction times (in ms; SE in parentheses). PE: per-
centages of error (in %). CE: compatibility effect (incompa-
tible–compatible). INT: intention based. Stim: stimulus
based. IMM: immediately. DEL: delayed.
p , .05.
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2007, 60 (11) 1547
MODES OF SENSORIMOTOR INTEGRATION
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
B
y:
 [U
ni
ve
rs
ite
 R
en
e 
D
es
ca
rte
s 
P
ar
is
 5
] A
t: 
11
:3
1 
9 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
00
7 
to arbitrary stimuli, participants in Experiment 3b
performed delayed (stim-DEL-SPA) or immediate
(stim-IMM-SPA) actions in response to spatial
stimuli. The participants of Experiment 3a were ran-
domly assigned to the two groups with 40 partici-
pants each. In order to increase the statistical power
for the contrast within the stim-IMM-ARB group,
we increased the number of participants of this
group by 20. The participants of Experiment 3b
were randomly assigned to the two groups with 30
participants each.
Material, methods, stimuli, apparatus, and procedure
The stim-IMM-ARB group (Experiment 3a) and
the stim-IMM-SPA group (Experiment 3b) were
replications of the stim-ARB and stim-SPA
groups of Experiment 1. The stim-DEL-ARB
(Experiment 3a) resembled the stim-DEL group
of Experiment 2 with the only exception that
now squares instead of asterisks were used. The
procedure of the stim-DEL-SPA was the same
as the procedure of the stim-DEL-ARB group,
except that spatial stimuli were used to cue the
response. In this group, the go signal was pre-
sented just around the fixation cross.
Results and discussion
Acquisition phase
Only correct responses without omissions or
anticipations were analysed (stim-IMM-ARB:
96.5%; stim-DEL-ARB: 98.2%; stim-IMM-
SPA: 99.1%; stim-DEL-SPA: 99.1%). Whereas
precued reactions in Experiment 3a (stim-DEL-
ARB overall: 283 ms) were faster than uncued
reactions (stim-IMM-ARB overall: 388 ms), this
was not the case in Experiment 3b (stim-DEL-
SPA overall: 304 ms; stim-IMM-SPA overall:
290 ms). This might well be due to a floor effect
in the spatial groups. RTs in the acquisition
phase were not different between the acquisition-
compatible versus acquisition-incompatible
subgroups.
Test phase
Missed trials (0.04% and 0.04% in Experiments 3a
and 3b, respectively) and anticipations (0.53% and
0.52%) were excluded from the analysis, and mean
RTs and PEs were calculated and analysed analo-
gously to Experiment 2. As can be seen in Table 3,
there were no significant compatibility effects in
Experiment 3a (stim-IMM-ARB ¼ 6 ms; stim-
DEL-ARB ¼ –6 ms), as well as in Experiment
3b (stim-IMM-SPA ¼ 7 ms; stim-DEL-SPA ¼
–26 ms). Neither the RT analysis nor the PE
analysis yielded any significant effect (all Fs ,
2.2, p . .15).
Experiments 3a and 3b once again confirm that
there is no action–effect integration as demon-
strated by Elsner and Hommel (2001) if partici-
pants performed a stimulus-based acquisition
phase. This was true for arbitrary and spatial as
Table 3.Reaction times and percentages of error in the test phase of Experiments 3a and 3b, as a function of learning group and compatibility,
and compatibility effect for reaction times
Experiment Acquisition Compatibility RT PE CE
3a (ARB) stim-IMM compatible 314 (9) 2.4 (0.4) 6
incompatible 320 (9) 2.8 (0.4)
stim-DEL compatible 320 (11) 2.2 (0.4) 26
incompatible 314 (14) 2.3 (0.4)
3b (SPA) stim-IMM compatible 325 (13) 3.0 (0.8) 7
incompatible 332 (17) 3.0 (0.8)
stim-DEL compatible 353 (15) 2.8 (0.5) 226
incompatible 327 (8) 1.7 (0.3)
Note: RT: reaction times (in ms; SE in parentheses). PE: percentages of error (in %). CE: compatibility effect (incompatible/
compatible). ARB: arbitrary stimulus–response mapping. SPA: spatial stimulus–response mapping. Stim: stimulus based. IMM:
immediately. DEL: delayed.
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well as for immediate and delayed stimulus-based
acquisition phases. To further corroborate this
finding, we meta-analysed the data at hand by
running an ANOVA on the RT data of
Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b with the between-
subject factors compatibility group (acquisition-
compatible vs. acquisition-incompatible) and
experimental condition (including all in all six
stimulus-based acquisition groups with a total of
216 participants). Neither the main effects nor
the interactions were significant: main effect of
compatibility group, F(1, 204) ¼ 0.718; main
effect of experimental condition, F(5, 204) ¼
1.509; interaction F(5, 204) ¼ 0.520. A post hoc
power analysis revealed that the sample size of
216 participants was sufficient to detect medium
effect sizes following the conventions of Cohen
(1988; f ¼ 0.25) with a high power of .96 for the
main effect of compatibility group when the con-
ventional significance level of alpha ¼ .05 is used
(Faul & Erdfelder, 1992). We believe that these
data are sufficient to claim that—under the
stimulus-based acquisition and the test conditions
described above—there is no effect of the
compatibility between action–effect mapping in
the acquisition phase and stimulus–response
mapping in the test phase.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The starting point of the present study was the
steadily growing body of evidence indicating that
(one and the same) overt action is controlled by
different neural substrates depending on whether
the action is intention based or stimulus based.
In the Introduction, we suggested that the activity
of these different pathways is based on different
types of memory traces—namely, that the activity
of the system guiding stimulus-based actions is
accompanied by stimulus–response (sensori-
motor) learning, whereas the activity of the
system controlling intention-based actions results
in action–effect (ideomotor) learning. If this
holds true, then acquisition-test transfer effects
of action–effect learning as demonstrated by
Elsner and Hommel (2001) should occur only if
the actions in the acquisition phase are controlled
by the voluntary action system.
The results strongly support this hypothesis.
They back once more the validity of the ideomotor
principle: Performing an action results in a bidir-
ectional association between the motor patterns
and ensuing sensory effects. These associations
are then used backwardly in order to retrieve an
appropriate action by “anticipating” desired
action effects. However, the results also demon-
strate that the ideomotor principle is subject to a
far-reaching constraint: It holds for intention-
based actions only! It is only in the intention-
based acquisition group (INT) of Experiments 1
and 2 that an action was faster if triggered by a
tone that the action had previously produced
(compatible condition) than if triggered by a
tone that had been produced by the alternative
action (incompatible condition). In contrast, in
the stimulus-based acquisition groups, there
was either a negative compatibility effect
(Experiment 1; for a discussion see Experiment
1) or no compatibility effect whatsoever
(Experiments 2, 3a, and 3b). This result shows
that the learning mechanism underlying the ideo-
motor principle is not as simple as originally
assumed by Elsner and Hommel (2001; see also
Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Elsner et al., 2002).
They proposed that action–effect learning has a
very simple associative basis—namely, that when-
ever a particular action code and a particular
sensory code are frequently coactivated, these
codes are integrated automatically, regardless of
the context the movement is carried out in.
In accordance with the results of the present
study are recent findings from Astor-Jack and
Haggard (2005). Astor-Jack and Haggard
suggest that the motor system for internally gener-
ated actions and the system for externally triggered
actions cannot be simultaneously active. They
showed that preparing an intention-based action
reduces the participants’ “reactivity”, in that the
motor output system is shielded against being
accessed from the stimulus-based system. The
same may hold true the other way round—that
is, preparing a stimulus-based action may shield
the motor output system against being accessed
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from the intention-based system. The effect of this
exclusivity of access to the motor system may be
that an action is bound to the triggering stimulus
or to the ensuing effect, respectively.
In a nutshell, we propose the following frame-
work to account for the results presented above. In
a stimulus–action–effect sequence, the codes of
those two events, which belong to the given pro-
cessing episode, are bound together. In the inten-
tion-based mode of movement, the memory trace
associates action and ensuing effect. In the
stimulus-based mode, however, the trace associ-
ates target stimulus and ensuing action. This is
because the two modes work in a different
fashion. In the stimulus-based mode, the partici-
pants pass on control to the stimuli in that the
system merely acts upon presentation of a particu-
lar stimulus in a prespecified way (prepared reflex,
Exner, 1879; Hommel, 2000). In this mode,
actions are selected with respect to their sensory
antecedents. In the intention-based mode, by con-
trast, actions are guided by the ideomotor prin-
ciple—that is, they are selected with respect to
their sensory consequences.
As concerns the intention-based mode, it could
be questioned that the reported effect is indeed due
to the compilation of bidirectional action–effect
associations during the acquisition phase. One
might argue that the effect in the intentional
groups was based on the greater similarity
between the acquisition phase and the test phase
for this group. However, first of all notice that
the assumption of one bidirectional association is
widely accepted and was recently supported in a
study with humans as well as with rats
(Arcediano, Escobar, & Miller, 2005). Second,
several other studies very similar to the conditions
with intention-based acquisition reported above
already provided direct evidence for the assump-
tion that, in the intention-based mode, bidirec-
tional associations between action and effect are
compiled and later on automatically retrieved.
Elsner et al. (2002) showed that the mere percep-
tion of auditory stimuli that previously had been
presented as effect tones of certain actions result
in the activation of neural motor structures.
Thus, action effects directly activate associated
motor codes. Moreover, Kunde (2004) observed
response priming by visual stimuli formerly pre-
sented as action effects although the effects were
masked during the test phase and thus could not
be consciously identified. Furthermore, unlike
the present study, Kunde used a within-subject
design. Kunde’s results, therefore, rule out any
strategic explanation or any explanation based on
the similarity between acquisition and test phase.
As concerns the stimulus-based mode, one may
object that ideomotor learning has already been
demonstrated when participants operate in a
“reactive” action control mode. Indeed, there is
evidence for response-effect learning that has
been obtained in experiments with “stimulus-
based” actions (Beckers, De Houwer, & Eelen,
2002; Elsner & Hommel, 2004; Hommel, 1996,
2004; Hoffmann, Sebald, & Stoecker, 2001;
Kunde, Hoffmann & Zellmann, 2002; Ziessler,
1998; Ziessler & Nattkemper, 2001, 2002). At
the moment, we do not have a complete under-
standing of the experimental parameters and
boundary conditions that lead to the diverging
patterns of results, but we see two possible
reasons: First, as mentioned in the Introduction,
exogenously driven actions exist on a continuum
with regard to their “reflex-likeness”, with real
reflexes being driven by stimulus information as a
necessary and sufficient condition and other stimu-
lus-based actions depending on an intentional set
that specifies how to respond to which stimulus.
The more complex this intentional set, the less
reflex-like the action. The immediate stimulus-
based actions used in the present study were rela-
tively easy or reflex-like compared to most of, if
not all, the studies mentioned above. Beckers
et al. (2002), for example, used word stimuli and
categorical judgements. Ziessler and Nattkemper
(2001) used a serial reaction task with eight poss-
ible stimuli. In the study of Kunde et al. (2002),
participants had to wait for a go signal before car-
rying out the response. In a study that otherwise is
quite similar to the present one, Elsner and
Hommel (2004) used a rather complex S–R
mapping, in which the location of an arrow indi-
cated the hand to be moved, and the arrow itself
indicated the direction of the movement. It is,
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thus, possible that the more complex or strong the
intentional set necessary to carry out a stimulus-
based action (i.e., the less reflex-like the action),
the more likely that the actions are accompanied
by ideomotor learning. However, notice that we
did not observe any transfer effect in the delayed
stimulus-based acquisition group, in which the
actions of the acquisition phase—although stimu-
lus based—were not very reflex-like. This shows
that ideomotor learning is hampered whenever
the action is selected with respect to some external
demand, regardless of the immediacy of the
execution of the action. In the light of this
finding it seems unlikely that, for example,
Elsner and Hommel (2004) observed ideomotor
learning because—due to the complexity of
the used S–R mapping—the actions were less
reflex-like.
Another possible reason for the divergent
results concerns the test phase rather than the
acquisition conditions. Priming research investi-
gates the change in the speed or accuracy of pro-
cessing of a probe event, as a result of prior
experience with the same or a related prime
event. It has been demonstrated that the more
operation time the system needs during the
probe event, the higher the likelihood to observe
priming (e.g., Logan, 1988). Recently, Waszak
and Hommel (in press) have shown that protract-
ing the operation time of the probe event makes
priming effects “appear” that otherwise go unno-
ticed. It is, thus, possible that it is the difference
in overall operation time of the test phases that
is responsible for the different results of the
present study and the one from Elsner and
Hommel (2004), for example. Probably due to
the more complex response mapping, mean RTs
in the test phase of Elsner and Hommel were
between 400 and 500 ms and, thus, about
100 ms slower than those in the present study.
Rather long mean RTs were also reported in the
study of Hommel (2004). Ziessler and
Nattkemper (2002) report mean RTs in the test
phase that were even longer (between 700 ms
and 950 ms), probably also due to the more
complex response mapping with eight stimuli
and four responses. If the divergence of the
results is indeed due to the test phases of the
studies mentioned above being more sensitive to
memory traces compiled during the acquisition
phase, then the difference in results between the
intention-based and the stimulus-based acqui-
sition groups of the present study would rather
be a question of degree. In that case intention-
based action selection would boost ideomotor
learning to the point that it becomes measurable
even if the test phase is rather insensitive to
transfer effects. This would fit very well to
certain findings in the literature—namely, that
in humans the contribution of medial and
lateral premotor cortices in intention-based and
stimulus-based actions is also rather a matter of
degree, with the medial premotor cortex being
only more active in intention-based actions, but
not exclusively (Deiber, Ibanez, Sadato, &
Hallett, 1996; Thut et al., 2000). This notion
also makes sense from a theoretical point
of view, since intention-based and stimulus-
based actions are in the real world inextricably
interwoven.
Binding operations as proposed above may be
an integral process of selection-for-action and sen-
sorimotor coordination. Binding together action
codes, on the one hand, and codes of target
stimuli or action effects, respectively, on the
other hand, may result in the compilation of two
different kinds of “dictionaries” instrumental to
the control of action: The activity of the stimulus-
based system may result in the compilation of a
kind of stimulus–response dictionary containing
rules about which motor routines action-relevant
objects habitually require (sensorimotor learning).
By contrast, the activity of the intention-based
system may entail the compilation of a kind of
action–effect dictionary containing rules about
which action produces which effect (ideomotor
learning). Both these kinds of memory trace may
guide future behaviour when the participant has
to act upon the same stimuli presented again or
when the participant intends to produce a certain
effect, respectively.
The notion that intention-based and stimulus-
based actions are accompanied by two
different kinds of binding mechanism is also
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supported by experiments on the perception of
stimulus–response and response-effect events. In
an experiment from Haggard, Aschersleben,
Gehrke, and Prinz (2002a), participants had to
judge the time when they pressed a key or when
a tone was presented by indicating the position
of a clock hand (Libet’s clock procedure; Libet,
Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Haggard et al.
found that perceptual onset times of actions and
their ensuing effects, on the one hand, and of
stimuli and subsequent actions in response to
them, on the other hand, attracted each other in
time. Moreover, the temporal attraction between
actions and their effects can be reversed when
the tones are triggered by involuntary movements
caused by transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) of the motor cortex (Haggard, Clark, &
Kalogeras, 2002b). The results from Haggard
and colleagues are complemented by recent
studies from Waszak et al. (2005b) and Keller
et al. (2006). In both these studies, participants
performed a temporal bisection task that involved
making left or right keypresses at the midpoint
between adjacent items in evenly timed sequences
of visually presented pacing signals. In separate
conditions participants either performed a choice
response to a preceding stimulus (stimulus-
based) or were free to select which of two keys to
press to produce the next stimulus (intention-
based). In both studies intention-based actions
were shifted in time towards their anticipated
effects (the next stimulus), whereas stimulus-
based actions were shifted towards their preceding
stimulus. Waszak and colleagues considered these
effects of the mode of movement on the actual
timing of movements to be an analogue in the
behavioural domain of the perceptual effects
found by Haggard et al. (2002a). We suggest
that the effects demonstrated in the present
study, in turn, reflect the long-term consequences
of the binding operations observed in the percep-
tual domain by Haggard et al. and in the timing
domain by Waszak and colleagues.
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